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1
GLENN J. MORRISON

EMMANUEL LEVINAS AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY
Faithful to the Talmudic tradition and seared by the experience of the
Shoah, Levinas’s life work is both a polemic against Christianity and a
proclamation of the Christianity envisaged by Matt 25. His writings
inevitably touch on theological themes central to Christian tradition. The
author examines four of these – God and love of neighbour, the paschal
theme, cosmology, and Eucharist – to show how Levinas can throw new
light on these mysteries of our faith, a light that shines from the crucible of
kenotic love, both human and divine.

C

hristianity and Rabbinic Judaism in the past two millennia have grown in
wisdom and understanding, mainly independently of each other. What is

fascinating in the twentieth century, and now the twenty-first century, is that
through the seeds of the Husserlian phenomenological tradition, Christianity and
Judaism have met and faced each other theologically and philosophically. This
meeting is exemplified par excellence in the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel
Levinas1. Following in the wake of Franz Rosenzweig2, Levinas’s writings
prophetically point to a bridge between these two great Abrahamic traditions.
1

Emmanuel Levinas was born in Kaunas, Lithuania in 1906 to Jewish parents. In such an

environment, he learned Russian and Hebrew, encountered the excesses of anti-Semitism and the
deep spiritual life of the Lithuanian Jewry. In 1923, he journeyed to France to study at the
University of Strassbourg where he quickly taught himself French and German. Later he studied
under Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger at the University of Freiberg. Levinas became a
French citizen and is credited by Sartre for introducing phenomenology to France. Much of
Levinas’ work is both influenced by and is a polemic against the work of Heidegger. It was the
event of World War Two that fuelled Levinas’ metaphysics with his original phenomenology and
understanding of existence as primarily ethical. After World War Two Levinas published
extensively. His two major works are ‘Totality and Infinity’ and ‘Otherwise than Being or

2

Even though Levinas is himself Jewish, his whole corpus is, paradoxically,
both a polemic against Christianity and a proclamation of Christian praxis
underlined in Matthew 25. Moreover, his work is a process of defining his Jewish
identity in a Christian European world of thought, language, violence, and hope.
Levinas’ writings cannot help but be inundated with Christian theological themes
and he does at times directly address them. Speaking Russian, German, and
French, as well as reading and translating from the Talmud in Hebrew, Levinas
immersed himself in the literature and writings of these traditions. Traces of these
traditions have been thematised by Levinas. From a Christian perspective, there
are many theological themes in his writings, such as the following: (1) God and
the love of neighbour; (2) paschal themes; (3) evil, sin and cosmology; and (4) the
Eucharist. It is these theological themes which will be addressed in this article.
All four theological themes are interrelated, and help to point the way to the
ethical horizon in which Levinas’ mind is focused. In articulating about these

Beyond Essence’. In many ways, Levinas’ life and works embody a spirituality of teaching. He
taught at the Alliance Israélite Universelle, the Universities of Poitiers and Paris-Nanterre and
since 1973 from the Sorbonne. Levinas’ philosophy is a prophetic stance against all violence,
injustice and evil.
2

Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929) was a German-Jewish philosopher. His major work combining

philosophy and theology is: ‘The Star of Redemption,’ focusing on the inter-relationship of God,
humanity and the world. It upholds that only Christianity and Judaism are the loci for the world’s
redemption. Judaism’s stance to the world is the proclamation of its closeness to God whilst
Christianity’s stance is its mission of evangelisation in the world. See Emmanuel Levinas,
Outside the Subject, translated by Michael B. Smith (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994),
61-63, for a discussion of Rosenzweig’s understanding of the roles of Christianity and Judaism –
the ‘Messianic “theory of Knowledge”’).

3
themes I will be more concerned with seeing the positive contribution of
Levinas’ writings for Christian theology rather than engaging in a critical analysis.
Underlying all the four theological themes is Levinas’ ethic of hyperbolic
responsibility – an order commanded and ordained by the face of the poor one.
Just as God is ‘the Infinite’, so our love of the neighbour must be a likeness of
God’s love for us. This points to the kenotic nature of our responsibility. Even
one is responsible for the persecutor. It is as if one drinks the ‘cup’ the Father has
given to Christ (Jn 18:11). The ‘paschal’ theme of kenosis in Levinas’ writings
points, further, to the reality of evil and sin. One is responsible for the whole
universe, and having being made in the likeness and image of God, one is the soul
of the universe. In this ethical-cosmic reality, ‘Eucharistic life’ is the fear for the
other’s death. All human life remains sacred. By creating the possibility for
Christian theology to be encountered by the demands and criticisms of Levinas’
metaphysics, a theological dialogue between Rabbinic Judaism and Christianity is
attempted in the hope that Christianity can learn from the insights of the former.

1. God and the love of neighbour.
What does it mean to love one’s neighbour? Where is God in such
loving? In approaching these questions, Levinas produces an ethical thinking that
seeks to stretch our imaginations and challenge our consciences. To love the
neighbour and to discover the presence of God are both Christian and Jewish
values. Such values seek to direct our lives. The degree in which Levinas
proclaims such values is hyperbolic.3 It is the idea of infinity that structures his

3

Emmanuel Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, translated by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh:

Duquesne University Press, 1998), 54.

4
ethical understanding of God and the love of one’s neighbour. The meaning of
other-centered experience is understood from the idea of infinity. Yet such
understanding goes further than understanding itself. It is to think more than
thinking. Levinas defines such hyperbolic thinking as desire for the other4 or
disinterestedness.5

Levinas’ Notion of God and Christian Pneumatology
To desire the other or to be disinterested is to experience a rupture of
being for oneself. When the other approaches in his or her nakedness and
destitution, the rupture of breaking with one’s ego-centred life is the effect of the
idea of infinity being ‘put into us’.6 When the infinite (divine) idea of the
neighbour’s brokenness fills our innards with mercy and compassion, one
becomes more than oneself.7 For one to experience such a surplus – ‘the thinker
who has the idea of infinity is more than himself’8 – could be the experience of

4

In translating Levinas’ writings from the French, ‘other’ [autre] is designated with a small ‘o’

and alludes ‘to otherness in general’ or ‘alterity’. ‘Other’ [Autrui] with a capital ‘O’ makes
reference ‘to the personal other’. It should be noted that Levinas at times does not distinguish
between ‘autre’ and ‘autrui’ and also some translators of Levinas’ work do not distinguish
between ‘autre’ and ‘autrui’ because of this difficulty. See the ‘Translator’s Note’ in Emmanuel
Levinas, Time and the Other, translated by Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University
Press, 1997), viii.
5

Often, Levinas will write ‘disinterestedness’ in French as ‘dés-inter-esse-ment’ in order to show

the break with ‘being’ (which in Latin is ‘esse’). As a result, the French makes more sense than
the English counterpart.
6

Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, 54.

7

Ibid.

8

Ibid.
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9

God, ‘the radically, absolutely, other’. What emerges theologically is how and
when God comes to mind.
God comes to mind when the naked and defenceless eyes of the neighbour
commands and graces us to be responsible. It is a purely passive
experience where the Infinite God overflows our consciousness with the
Good. The Divine Word proclaims to our conscience, ‘You shall not
kill!’10
Levinas is seeking theologically to define what is truly human. The true human
life is the life of the spirit, the life of disinterestedness (1 Cor 2:9-13).

The life of the spirit (the Holy Spirit in us) is represented par excellence in
the love of one’s neighbour. Levinas’ ethical metaphysics complements Christian
pneumatology. St. Paul writes, ‘For what human being knows what is truly
human except the human spirit that is within?’ (1 Cor 2:11). ‘The human spirit
that is within’ is the life of loving one’s neighbour – the ethical resistance to
murder, political violence, and economic injustice. It is ‘the Spirit that is from
God’ (1 Cor 2:12) that reveals to the human heart ‘what God has prepared for
those who love him’ (1 Cor 2:9), namely the face of the other, the poor one, who
points the way to salvation and the eschatological vision of the Reign of God.

Levinas understands the notion of God ethically through being responsible
for the poor one. This suggests that God is desired through the face of the other
more than merely surmised about. God is posited as closer to the neighbour than

9

Ibid.

10

Ibid., 55.
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oneself: ‘The other must be closer to God than I.’

11

Theologically, the Holy

Spirit is wholly other-centred, being the infinite disinterested love the Father and
the Son have for each other and the world. The notion of God cannot be removed
from the ideas of infinity, desire, the neighbour, and justice. For Levinas, it is that
‘unquenchable’12 desire for the stranger that takes the measure of all that is
infinite – God, love, and justice.
This ‘unquenchable’ desire reveals the notion of God and is at the
foundation of both Levinas’ phenomenology and non-phenomenology of the face
(more like a post-phenomenology). Therefore, in understanding Levinas’ notion
of God, one is confronted with a movement (that overcomes ontology) from
ontological phenomenology to ethical metaphysics, and thus an original
reworking of Husserl’s phenomenological theory of intuition. This movement can
be understood as a movement from ‘being’ to ‘otherwise than being’ that is
symbolised in Levinas’ two major works. In Totality and Infinity, we observe a
seasoned unfolding of his thought and are presented with a vital opening to
appropriate key terms for Christian theology.

Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (1961)
Levinas first major work, Totality and Infinity, is a work of ontological
phenomenology13 directed against the Heideggerian notion of Being. The work

11

Ibid., 56.

12

Ibid.

13

Phenomenology (La Phénoménologie): The seeking of transcendental knowledge of what is

experienced in one’s consciousness in order to uncover meaning. Levinas’ ‘phenomenology’
seeks to study what goes beyond consciousness, language and thought, namely the Other, God,
death and time. In this sense, it is more a post-phenomenology. What makes it original is its

7
seeks to overcome the totality of Heideggarian Being (‘the primacy of freedom
over ethics’14 [le primat de la liberté par rapport à l’éthique]’)15 by replacing it
with the ‘idea of the infinity of the Other’16 who ‘resembles God’17. The idea of
infinity is related to the other’s face. For Levinas, the face is ‘l’expérience par
excellence’18 whereby God puts the self into question.

Here, the self is faced

with a radical and metaphysical exteriority that Levinas articulates through his
phenomenology of the face. He constructs such a phenomenology in order to
describe the ethical relationship in terms of his notion of infinity. As a result, the
face is an infinite and non-phenomenal testimony of ethics and the resistance to
totality.

What is striking in Levinas’ metaphysics is that he utilises phenomenology
as a philosophical method in order to bring to light the ethical relation. Moreover,
for Levinas, morality is first philosophy

19

that is illumined through a

phenomenology of the face based on Franz Rosenzweig’s opposition to totality20

rejection of Being or presence. As a result, Levinas searches to describe how one can be truly
responsible when one is beyond Being or beyond the world of presence.
14

Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, translated by Alphonso

Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1996), 45.
15

Emmanuel Levinas, Totalité et infini: essai sur l’extériorité, Quatième édition (The Hague:

Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984), 16.
16

Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 204.

17

Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 293.

18

Levinas, Totalité et infini, 170.

19

Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 304.

20

Ibid., 28.

8
and Descartes idea of the Infinite . The following quotation from Totality and
21

Infinity underlines Levinas’ phenomenology of the face and the idea of God:

There can be no ‘knowledge’ of God separated from the relationship with
men.

The Other is the very locus of metaphysical truth, and is

indispensable for my relation with God. He does not play the role of a
mediator. The Other is not the incarnation of God, but precisely by his
face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in
which God is revealed.22

The passage highlights the key terms of the Other, the face, and God. The
notion of the face is central to the drama of the ethical relation and God’s selfcommunication. It is an opening to God and the production of justice:

The presence of the face coming from beyond the world, but committing
me to human fraternity, does not overwhelm me as a numinous essence
arousing fear and trembling. To be in relationship while absolving oneself
from this relationship is to speak. The Other does not only appear in his
face, as a phenomenon subject to the action and domination of a freedom;
infinitely distant from the very relation he enters, he presents himself there
for the first as an absolute.23

21

Ibid., 25.

22

Ibid., 78-79.

23

Ibid., 215.

9
Though we are faced with the presence of the other, that he or she is always
nearby, articulating it is a difficult matter. How difficult and even enigmatic is
shown in the way Levinas speaks of the ethical relation.

He begins, ‘The

presence of the face coming from beyond the world’. The face is a trace of what
is beyond being and it is ‘absolute’ because it absolves us from seeing it as
occasion to mask its truth. This is the encounter with otherness, that by which the
other withdraws ‘as he presents himself’. Now, the fundamental terms of ‘the
face’ and ‘the other,’ reveal the derivative, ‘otherness,’ an abiding disclosure of
the good that lies beyond being.

Levinas’ phenomenology, along with his vision of God in the other’s face,
is a confronting order in our ethical consciousness. Responding to the order, the
responsible self transcends itself towards the other’s fear and loneliness. It is a
movement provoked by the other’s infinite look of destitution and horror, for
everyone is guilty in the face of the other, guilty even in their responsibility. To
give all and more, at the dramatic point when justice is demanded, is to live with
the burden of constantly putting one’s conscience into question. It is the ‘good
life’ because the demand for justice coincides with mercy.

After Totality and Infinity, the crucial development from phenomenology to
non-phenomenology further directed the unfolding of an original ethical
metaphysics in Levinas’ thought. Here we encounter new terms such as beyond
being, the non-phenomenology of the face, diachrony, illeity, proximity, glory,
witness, substitution, the Saying and the said.

10
Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence (1974)
It would seem that true ethical life only becomes possible at the point of
disinterestedness. Levinas calls this ‘otherwise than being’. This means to live
otherwise than the conatus essendi. This is because our personal struggles are not
so nicely under our control. Tragically and comically they end in an anonymous
and depersonalised life that cannot escape both the gaze of the neighbour and
judgment of God. Otherwise than Being represents an attempt to overcome the
totality of Being through the development of an ethical metaphysics that
transcends ontology and phenomenology. It extends Levinas’ notion of infinity to
a non-phenomenology of the face. What is unique in this metaphysics is the
rupture it causes among existents.

The rupture itself emanates from an

immemorial past, namely a time beyond the totalising forces of Being. No longer
are existents posited as being interested in the world of commerce and pleasure,
but as disinterested.

Otherwise than Being begins with addressing the issue of onto-theology:
‘But to hear a God not contaminated by Being is a human possibility no less
important and no less precarious than to bring Being out of the oblivion in which
it is said to have fallen in metaphysics and onto-theology.’24 To hear a God not
corrupted by Being is to begin reflecting on ethics and avoid contaminating God
with thought and language. Having an ethical ground avoids the greater danger of

24

Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, translated by Alphonso Lingis

(Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1999), xlviii.

confusing God with Being and the lesser of confusing Being with God.

25

11
God

is a ‘being otherwise’26 than what is thought and said, and reveals God’s self as a
trace in the neighbour and in the saying of ‘Here I am’.27 Levinas is seeking to
understand God, humanity and the world outside of ontology and sense perception.
The danger of onto-theology is it seeks to objectify everyone and everything. It
is only through a disinterested subjectivity that God, humanity and the world
come truly to mind.

In Otherwise than Being, the life of substitution, expiation and kenosis
represent the trace of the ‘kingdom of a non-thematizable God’. 28 Levinas is
haunted and traumatised by the suffering of the other. These experiences awake
him to sensitivity and compassion. Here his non-phenomenology of the face
emerges: ‘The face of a neighbour signifies for me an unexceptionable
responsibility, preceding every free consent, every pact, every contact. It escapes
representation; it is the very collapse of phenomenality.’29 How do we keep the
other alive and free from danger? How can we ever perceive our neighbour in
order to keep him or her safe? In an enigmatic way, the face of the neighbour
escapes representation by reflecting itself as a ‘non-form’30: a ‘trace of a past’31
25

Rudi Visker, ‘The Price of Being Dispossessed: Levinas’s God and Freud’s Trauma,’ in Jeffrey

Bloechl, (Ed.), The Face of the Other & The Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of
Emmanuel Levinas (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 247.
26

Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 7.

27

Ibid., 145.

28

Ibid., 52.

29

Ibid., 88.

30

Ibid., 88.

31

Ibid, 97.
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that has never been present. Moreover, the face speaks of the past as ‘an
immemorial past’ of responsibility that is more ancient than sin. 32 With the
emergence of the Other’s face, comes the command to be responsible, provoking
the self’s conscience into the experience of guilt.

However, the self’s

consciousness of its guilty state comes too late, for paradoxically as the neighbour
approaches, he or she has already withdrawn in a way that even ‘expels’33 its own
traces. This is what the otherness [altérité] or the non-phenomenology of the face
communicates. Already the time for responsibility has long passed
In Levinas’ non-phenomenology of the face, the suffering other reveals a ‘delay’34
and an ‘extreme urgency’ 35 of justice.
disturbance.

Being called to responsibility is a

The face disturbs us otherwise from our present situation.

Furthermore the face is a diachronic opening to ‘non-said time’36: to what is in
Levinas’ terms, the Reign of God. The face is uniquely a disturbance in which
new capacities for living the ethical life are discovered. The diachronic otherness
of the face (what Levinas terms the trace of illeity) ‘concerns me otherwise’37,
freeing our nature from mindless destruction, murder and war.

32

See Stephen Webb, ‘The Rhetoric of Ethics as Excess: A Christian Theological Response to

Emmanuel Levinas,’ Modern Theology vol. 15:1 (January, 1999), 9. [PLEASE GIVE FULL
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL DETATILS – VOL. NO., AND ISSUE, IF NECESSARY] The page
numbers of the article are from 1-16.
33

Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 94.

34

Ibid.

35

Ibid., 89.

36

Ibid.

37

Ibid.
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In spite of the depths of evil in our lives, God commands and ordains us
through the other’s face.38 In the other’s nakedness and destitution, God takes the
form of the call for justice and seeks us out to be responsible, slipping into one
like a thief. This is the act of God’s glory in us.

Whether we name the glory of the Infinite as the Reign of God or the true
ethical life or illeity, it is always otherwise than our own needs and pleasures.
The face of the other orders us to a life of expiation and substitution. St. Paul’s
words, ‘For what human being knows what is truly human except the human spirit
that is within?’ (1 Cor 2:11) seems to bear witness to what Levinas means by the
glory of the Infinite. The human spirit or the other’s alterity is the deep call to put
one’s conscience into question and be responsible, even to the point of being a
hostage for the other. It is also the call for the poor one demanding food and
shelter in his or her destitution and nakedness. The human spirit slips into our
consciousness like a thief before the face of the other disturbing our consciences
and reminding us that we are made in the likeness and image of God. With this in
mind, let us now turn to the influence of Haim of Volozhin.

Haim of Volozhin and the Image of God
The Talmudic theology of Haim of Volozhin39 has helped Levinas to
articulate that being made in the likeness and image of God is an original
responsibility. He reflects:
38

Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, xxxi.

39

The Lithuanian Rabbi, Haim of Volozhin (1759-1821), above all with his posthumously

published work, ‘The Soul of Life’ (Nefesh Hahaim), integrally influenced Levinas’ philosophy.
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God associates with or withdraws from the worlds, depending upon
human behaviour. Man is answerable for the universe! Man is
answerable for others…. Man is, like the Creator himself, at the apex of
the hierarchy of the world, the soul of the universe.40

To be made in the likeness and image of God means specifically to be called to be
like God in the world – creating goodness, expiating and infinitely loving.
Levinas’ ethical philosophy proclaims a spiritual teaching for all human
behaviour. The spiritual teaching is the prophetic call to take on the responsibility
of being ‘the soul of the universe’. Each one of us bears the irrefragable
responsibility of ‘being answerable for the universe’ i.e. ‘answerable for others’.
The poor one whom we have ignored, never known or never wanted to know is
the universe wherein the face of God commands and orders each soul to create
goodness, expiate and infinitely love. Salvation depends upon one’s kenotic
responsibility. The poor one’s face reveals the eschatological Reign of God - the
kenotic life of shouldering the world’s sins, suffering and horror. The human
spirit hopes for what God has prepared through the life of ethical holiness. Again
St. Paul’s words are proclaimed in the universe, ‘For what human being knows
what is truly human except the human spirit that is within?’

The ‘human spirit that is within’ is the dignity of being made in the
likeness and image of God. Our ‘very identity’ is unveiled when the poor one

40

Levinas, In the Time of Nations, translated by Michael B. Smith (Indianapolis: Indiana

University Press, 1994), 125.
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faces us and when we respond with the food from our very own mouth.
Levinas teaches that being responsible involves the universe. The universe
overflows with economic, political and social evil. Being responsible is being
responsive to economic injustice, political violence and social oppression that
poison the soul of the poor one with useless suffering, fear and death. To be in
the image of God is to be the soul of the universe.

Hypostasis
Ontologically, Levinas implies that the movement from the life of evil to
that of kenosis involves a ‘hypostasis’41. Levinas writes, ‘I spoke thus of the
‘hypostasis’ of existents, that is, the passage from being to a something, from the
state of verb to the state of being.’42 Living life, as a verb – anonymously existing
- is being for oneself which Levinas likens to the state of Heideggerian ‘care’
(Sorge). Existing purely for oneself is evil and signifies a pagan hypostatic
existence.

The ethical hypostasis is the responsible human being. In Christian
theology, the ‘hypostasis’ refers to the one divine person of Jesus Christ wherein
there is the hypostatic union of a divine and a human nature. Levinas’ thought
acts as an aid to Christian theology to point out that the hypostatic union in Christ
is an event pointed against all anonymous and depersonalising evil. It is a
dramatic event of salvation. Ethical hypostasis suggests the possibility of
41

Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, translated by A. Lingis, (Boston: Kluwer

Academic Publishers, 1995), 82-83.
42

Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, Conversations with Philippe Nemo, translated by

Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1999), 51.
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salvation where the goodness of God overflows in the self. As a result, all
forms of depersonalising evil that tempt the self such as hedonism, narcissism,
gossip, lying and murder and oppression are put into question. In Christian terms,
who is the one to overcome all this evil? It is the same as asking, ‘Who is
Christ?’
For Levinas the archetype of the hypostasis is the ‘Messiah’: ‘The true object of
hope is the Messiah, or salvation.’43 In contrast, for Christian theology, Christ is
at once the Messiah, hope and salvation. The hypostasis of the Logos witnesses
to the eschatological and soteriological presence of God-with-us. Behind
Levinas’ reflection on the ‘Messiah’ are perhaps hidden eschatological and
soteriological considerations. However, any articulation about God for Levinas is
usually concealed by ambiguity, the main difficulty being that being encountered
by God is more an effacement of God’s presence rather than a manifestation. The
idea of God is truly an enigma. Notwithstanding such an ambiguity, Levinas’
thought does seem to parallel the Christian understanding of the paschal
(messianic) life as participation in the Reign of God.

2. Paschal Themes in Levinas
Levinas’s ethical metaphysics is attuned to the experience of suffering,
death and new life. These experiences are personal and Levinas writes in trauma
as a guilty survivor of Hitlerism and all its diabolical barbarity.

Persecution, Substitution and Mercy

43

Levinas, Existence and Existents, 91.
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Suffering par excellence is the experience of persecution; death par
excellence symbolises being responsible (answerable) for the other’s death44; and
new life par excellence is embracing hope in hopelessness. These Levinasian
themes could be conceived as paralleling a ‘paschal’ life. Levinas even borrows
Christian paschal language even though he is himself Jewish. In writing about the
Shoah, he does use the word ‘passion’ as the following passage exemplifies:

In front of the representatives of so many nations, some of whom have no
Jews in their numbers, I should like to remind you of what the years 1933
to 1945 were like for the Jews of Europe. Among the millions of human
beings who encountered misery and death, the Jews alone experienced a
total dereliction. They experienced a condition inferior to that of things,
an experience of total passivity, an experience of Passion. Chapter 53 of
Isaiah was drained of all meaning for them. Their suffering, common to
them as to all the victims of war, received its unique meaning from racial
persecution which is absolute, since it paralyses, by virtue of its very
intention, any flight, from the outset refuses any conversion, forbids any
self-abandonment, any apostasy in the etymological sense of the term; and
consequently touches the very innocence of being recalled to its ultimate
identity.45

44

Levinas, Entre Nous, Thinking-of-the-Other, translated by Michael B. Smith and Barbara

Harshav (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 171-72.
45

Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, translated by Seán Hand (Baltimore:

The John Hopkins University Press, 1997), 12.
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For Levinas, the Shoah is ‘an event of still inexhaustible meaning’.

46

In this

passage, the phrase, ‘an experience of total passivity’ is profoundly paschal. The
experience of Christ was one of complete passivity to the will of the Father. The
Paschal Mystery is the life of disinterestedness – the rupture of God in Christ
among us. The passion of the Shoah too is one of disinterestedness wherein all
victims of persecution proclaim through their face an infinite and ethical
resistance to murder.

Ultimately suffering is not useless, for suffering as the persecuted one has
the possibility of turning into expiation for another’s evil. In the absolute
passivity of expiating suffering, there is no self-abandonment to self-pity, drugs,
alcohol, suicide, or revenge. The ultimate identity of being made in the likeness
and image of an expiating God remains. Taking responsibility for one’s
persecutor suggests an existence to be like God, the soul of the universe.

Living

out an expiating responsibility is obsessive and excessive state of existence that
gnaws at the self’s limits. Emptying oneself of all one’s freedom to be
responsible for the other is what Levinas terms, ‘incarnation’47. He writes, ‘The
form of incarnation’ of the persecuted one is ‘being-in-one’s-skin, having-theother-in-one’s-skin.’48

In Christian theology, the theological link between the first kenosis (the
Incarnation) and the Second (the Paschal Mystery) is the experience of God’s
46

Emmanuel Levinas, Alterity and Transcendence, translated by Michael B. Smith (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1999), 161.
47

Ibid., 115.

48

Ibid.
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self-emptying goodness. This same self-emptying goodness ‘to the point of
death’ (Phil 2:8) witnesses to a grave responsibility of fearing for the other’s
death.49 For Levinas, fearing for the other translates as fearing for God and is
articulated par excellence through the action of prayer. Levinas’ notion of
responsibility is however subject to his idiosyncratic terminology. He will use the
notion of ‘diachrony’ or responsibility through time to give a nuanced and
enigmatic explanation of ethical action in the world. His notion is further
complicated and pierced by the memory of the Shoah. He points out that the six
million dead – representing ‘human beings least corrupted by the ambiguities of
our world’50 – bear the dignity of ‘martyrs’.51 We see that diachrony is a notion
overflowing with trauma, the hope for the impossible and the incomprehensibility
of interpreting whether the one has encountered God or evil. Further, Levinas
uses the notion of the hostage as a starting point to draw meaning to the life of
diachrony and kenosis.
For Levinas, the persecuted one or martyr is the ‘hostage’52 expiating for
the other. In Christian terms the persecuted Christ has taken the form ‘of a slave’
(Phil 2:7). As a hostage, the archetypal persecuted one conveys the quality of
maternity: ‘Maternity, which is bearing par excellence, bears even responsibility
for the persecuting by the persecutor.’53 The degree of such ‘maternal’
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responsibility gives light to the witness of Christ in the paschal drama and
emphasises that to be made in the likeness and image of God is to engender mercy
to the world.

Kenosis and the State of Being a Hostage
To envision the persecuted one as an expiating hostage is to witness to the
glory of God’s kenosis. Sharing in this divine kenosis of being infinitely
responsible is at the heart of both Christianity and Judaism: ‘I am pleased to
accept the parallelism in the theory of kenosis, and in the idea of an omni-human
universality and a ‘for all men’. I have understood Christianity in its ‘to live and
die for all men.’54 Being for all people is analogous to being a hostage or a slave.
It is to enter the diachronic time of responsibility that allows one to substitute
himself or herself for the other as a hostage. This is the ‘beyond being’ of
expiation wherein one’s true identity is found through service. The spiritual
development of a kenotic life (diachronic time) is experienced in ‘the very fact of
finding oneself while losing oneself’55 as a hostage for the other.56 Levinas’ use
of Christian theological and Scriptural language is necessary as a Jewish
philosopher living in a Christian world. The influence of Christian language
deepens his desire to translate the Talmud through his philosophy. The phrase,
‘the very fact of finding oneself while losing oneself,’ suggests a ‘paschal’
character as expressed in the New Testament (Mt 10:39. 16:25; Mk 8:35; Lk 9:24.
17:33). The question arises as to how far Levinas’ ethics parallels Christian
theological themes. For example, the ‘activity’ of losing oneself for the other
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speaks of a passivity that only a God-Man might endure: ‘But this saying

57

remains, in its activity, a passivity, more passive than all passivity, for it is a
sacrifice without reserve, without holding back, and in this non-voluntary – the
sacrifice of a hostage designated who has not chosen himself to be hostage, but
possibly elected by the Good, in an involuntary election not assumed by the
elected one.’58 In view of thinking of Levinas’ thought otherwise in a Christian
theological context, the passage raises the question on whether Christ’s will is
‘involuntary’. To what extent was Christ’s action of obedience to the Father’s
will passive? Did not Christ take the form of a ‘slave’ (Phil 2:8)? Christ’s
expiating for humanity on the Cross was indeed ‘a sacrifice without reserve’.
Christ possesses a human nature absolutely obedient to the Father’s will. In
Levinasian terms, could not this obedience be signified as ‘a passivity, more
passive than all passivity’? If so, Christ in taking the form of a slave in the world
could be conceived as the ‘hostage’ of God.

Prayer
In the spirit of Rabbi Haim of Volozhin’s writings, Levinas states: ‘True
prayer, then, is never for oneself, never for one’s own needs.’59 Prayer is despite
oneself. To pray is to be beyond the being of one’s suffering. Prayer is the
experience of kenosis and the allowing of the kenosis of God to assuage one’s
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suffering.

60

Levinas reflects in a spirit seemingly very near to the Christian

paschal mystery:

When you are truly in distress, you can mention it in prayer. But are you
going to eliminate in this manner a suffering that wipes away sins in
expiating them. If you want to escape your own suffering, how will you
expiate your wrong-doings? The question is more complex. In our
suffering God suffers with us. Doesn’t the psalmist say (Psalms 91:15): ‘I
am with him in distress’? It is God who suffers most in human suffering.
The I who suffers prays for the suffering of God, who suffers by the sin of
man and the painful expiation for sin. A kenosis of God! Prayer,
altogether, is not for oneself.61

In Christian terms, Christ could be conceived as the God-Man ‘who
suffers by the sin of man and the painful expiation for sin’? Even though such a
question faces the danger of Christianising Levinas’s philosophy, his Talmudic
reflection here appears almost Christian and paschal in character. Could this be
why more Christian theologians are perhaps interested in his thought rather
Jewish theologians?

3. Evil, Sin, and Cosmology
Levinas’ ethical metaphysics is concerned with understanding evil as a
form of impersonal and anonymous existing. He names this impersonal nature of
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Being as the ‘there is’ [il y a]. Levinas’ thinking on the ‘there is’ begins with
his book, Existence and Existents, written during his time of captivity in the
‘stalag’62[SHOULD THIS BE UPPER CASE S? - no] during World War Two.
The context of Levinas’ philosophical reflection on evil is important. In the midst
of a Europe drowning in totalising evil, Levinas sought to perceive the nature of
this diabolical totality. Just as he saw the rain coming down anonymously, so he
perceived Hitlerism murdering countless numbers of innocents anonymously.
Every participant in the Nazi regime who murdered did not possess a face. To kill,
to murder, to forget the hungry and the poor, is to mask one’s true face with the
plasticity of evil, violence and of totality. Levinas describes this ‘phenomenon of
impersonal being’63 as a disturbing and silent rumbling: ‘It is something
resembling what one hears when one puts an empty shell close to the ear, as if the
emptiness were full, as if the silence were a noise. It is something one can also
feel when one thinks that even if there were nothing, the fact that ‘there is’ is
undeniable. Not that there is this or that; but the very scene of being is open:
there is. In the absolute emptiness that one can imagine before creation – there
is.’64 The ‘there is’ is a trace of the nothingness that was before all creation. The
‘there is’ alludes to Gen 1:1-2. In these verses, there is a feeling of ‘absolute
emptiness,’ especially in the phrase, ‘formless void’. In the beginning, the earth
lacked all the beautiful and good creation of God. Because ‘the earth was a
formless void,’ it existed only anonymously as an impersonal nothingness. These
verses of Genesis help to point to an understanding of Levinas’s notion of
anonymous Being as a ‘formless void’ or an ‘absolute emptiness’ that lacks the
62
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goodness of creation. Moreover, Levinas’ phenomenology of evil implicitly
seeks to unravel the mystery of the universe.

Developing a Levinasian Cosmology
Levinas’ understanding of the ‘there is’ is the starting point of a
cosmology that can be intuited from his ethical metaphysics. The ‘there is’
mirrors the ‘formless void’ of Gen 1:2. The origins of the nature of the universe
could be conceived as, firstly, the anonymous existing of this formless void and
secondly, God’s act of creation. God began God’s acts of creation out of nothing,
out of the anonymous evil of the formless void. Before all creation, there existed
goodness (God) and the formless void (evil or an infinite excess of anonymous
Being). The first verses of Genesis are perhaps a key to the whole of our human
existence studied in the light of Levinas’ thought. What does God do when ‘the
earth was a formless void’? God creates. First God creates ‘light’ by separating it
from the darkness and secondly God creates the sky by separating the upper and
lower waters. Everything God creates is envisioned as ‘good’ (Gen 1:10). The
origins of the nature of the universe – wherein the earth is used as an archetype –
is God’s idea to create infinite goodness that seeks to overcome the anonymous
and impersonal nothingness of the formless void (the ‘there is’).
For Levinas, the origin of evil is posited as the ‘there is’ - this ‘absolute
emptiness’ that infinitely seeks to totalise all of God’s creation into its own
diabolical nothingness. This implies that every experience of evil in our world is
a trace of the formless void that existed before all creation. The purpose of evil is
to destroy all creation to the degree of absolute emptiness. This means that every
time there is a murder, a lie or an injustice, some part of God’s good creation
reverts into an image of the formless void.

25

This evil seeks to annihilate the ‘human’ out of human beings; it seeks to
depersonalise us such that there is ‘existence without existents’. Evil rests in the
ruins of a human spirit leaving only the darkness of ‘horror and panic.’65 Such
‘horror and panic’ are inscribed upon every victim’s face of dehumanising evil.
The ‘there is’ is a totality of formless infinity, trapping like a black hole, every
thought and action of human evil. Only the ‘goodness’ of God’s creation found in
the state of disinterestedness – of being responsible for the poor one – can
hypostatically break the hold of evil’s gravity. To be human is to be responsible,
and with such a stance of goodness, one is responsible for the universe. Moreover,
having been made in the likeness and image of God, one is ‘the soul of the
universe’.

Levinasian Cosmology, Eschatology and Soteriology
In Christian terms, the soul of the universe par excellence is Jesus Christ
who, through his expiating death, took responsibility for the universe. Jesus is the
new creation. Rom 8:22 proclaims, ‘We know that the whole creation has been
groaning in labour pains until now.’ Levinas’s implicit cosmology is an aid for
the Christian in understanding the promises of the cosmic Christ: ‘Blessed are the
poor in spirit, for there is the kingdom of heaven’ (Matt 5:3) and ‘Truly I tell you,
just as you did it to one of the least of these who are members of my family, you
did it to me’ (Matt 25:40).
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The formless void (the ‘there is’) is constantly in tension with the
goodness of God’s creation, ever trying to return to its reign of absolute emptiness.
It is only the act of creation – present as traces in every human act of goodness –
that can hypostatically confront and overcome the anonymous ‘sheer fact of
being’.66 It is the hypostasis of the God-Man Christ who, through his kenotic
sacrificial death on the Cross, instils sacred feelings of mercy, compassion and
love into our human existence. At the very moment where all was lost on the
Cross, everything became possible. The faith of Christ upon the Cross to the
point of death was itself an act of creating goodness giving birth to hope in this
very moment of despair. Levinas writes on the mystery of hope, time and
salvation:

Time is not a succession of instants filing before an I, but the response to
the hope for the present, which in the present is very expression of the ‘I’,
and is itself equivalent to the present. All the acuteness of hope in the
midst of despair comes from the exigency that the very instant of despair
be redeemed. To understand the mystery of the work of time, we should
start with the hope for the present, taken as a primary fact. Hope hopes for
the present itself. Its martyrdom does not slip into the past, leaving us
with a right to wages. At the very moment where all is lost, everything is
possible.67
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Levinas’ phenomenological analysis of hope opens an eschatological and
soteriological context for cosmology. One of the most moving sentences in all of
Levinas’ works is: ‘At the very moment where all is lost, everything is
possible.’68 Perhaps this gives an insight into the origins of the universe where
the state of absolute emptiness – a moment of despairing nothingness that
consumes ‘the infinity of existence’69 – naturally resists (and rejects) the goodness
of God’s creation. Traces of such evil remain and appear too close in our world.
Levinas reminds us how close the depersonalising evil of the ‘there is’ came to its
ultimate return to itself, to absolute emptiness:

This is the century that in thirty years has known two world wars, the
totalitarianisms of right and left, Hitlerism and Stalinism, Hiroshima, the
Gulag, and the genocides of Auschwitz and Cambodia. This is the century
that is drawing to a close in the obsessive fear of the return of everything
these barbaric names stood for: suffering and evil inflicted deliberately,
but in a manner no reason set limits to, in the exasperation of a reason
become political and detached from all ethics.70

Levinas’ ethical thought reinforces especially to Judaism and Christianity that
suffering is not useless. At the very moment where all was lost at Auschwitz, the
faithfulness to God of every Jew proclaiming the sacredness of life was able to
disarm the diabolical evil of Hitlerism. Judaism survived Hitlerism, and such an
68
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event of survival points to the fact that God’s creation of goodness will survive
the annihilating presence of evil. The ‘passion’ of Auschwitz and the ‘passion’ of
the Cross, witness to the hope that the impossibility of surviving death71 is
possible. In this context, the origins of the nature of the Universe are a possible
impossibility of God’s gift of the Good.

The Divine Comedy
How many times in our own life do we confuse evil as goodness, and goodness as
evil? Being encountered by God in the world can be easily confused as evil.
How often in our own lives do we interpret sufferings as a burden or being
harshly treated by God? To break such confusion, Levinas teaches us to live
‘beyond being’ or ‘otherwise than being’. However, these are very enigmatic
teachings that often leave the reader hoping for any practical examples to decode
Levinas’ phenomenological language. The task of comprehending Levinas’
writings is itself a laborious task. For example he refers to the trace of the ‘divine
comedy’ in ambiguous terms as ‘transcendence to the point of absence’.72
Surprisingly, he does give a practical example for this by paralleling it with ‘the
[that] laughter sticks in one’s throat as the neighbour approaches’.73
Now what possible cosmological and theological association could we make
with such an explanation? I realise to pose such a question is to depart from
Levinas’ thought as his interests did not specifically lie explaining the origins and
71
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nature of the universe in cosmological and theological terms. I think the
essential point is the starting point for theological-cosmological considerations
must begin with ethics, for our love for the neighbour. Any discovery about the
universe and our place in it speaks of a kenotic participation in God’s divine plan
for the world. In Levinasian terms this translates as being like God, the soul of
the universe.

The Soul of the Universe
‘The soul of the universe’ is another enigmatic phrase that Levinas borrows from
Rabbi Haim of Volozhin. It points specifically to the principle of justice in God
[Elohim] that we too find in ourselves as images of God. In another guise in
Levinas’ thought, the role of being the soul of the universe is articulated as
substituting for the other as a hostage. To substitute one’s freedom for the other’s
well-being is to transcend the absolute emptiness (the ‘there is’) that seeks to trap
and then sap the ‘universe’ of all created goodness. Evil is overcome through
suffering for the other, and this is why Levinas defines ‘substitution for another’
as ‘the condition – or the unconditionality – of being a hostage’.74 The evil
suffered on the neighbour’s face - branded on his or her ‘wrinkled skin’75- is
apprehended by the hostage as if they are ‘cries … already addressed to God’.76
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Just as the ‘there is’ is conceived as a rumbling silence, the silence upon
the face of the poor one resounds to the responsible hostage. Awakening to these
poignant cries despite one’s own needs and afflictions, is for the hostage to realise
that he or she can never be passive enough to the other’s destitution. There is an
infinite obligation. Levinas is fond of quoting Dostoyevsky’s, The Brothers
Karamazov, ‘Each of us is guilty before everyone, for everyone and for each one,
and I more than the others.’77 Just as God has never finished creating the universe,
so we are challenged to never finish ‘emptying myself of myself’78 of all one’s
needs, greed, and narcissistic pursuits of life. The hostage – responsible to the
point of insomnia – represents the soul of the universe par excellence. Whenever
one gives the food out of one’s very own mouth to the poor one, one is witnessing
to the Infinite and to the reality that God saw all creation as good.

The Secret of Gyges79
Desire is a very common experience. When we are young, we desire our
family and friends and things that give pleasure. This pattern of desire continues
through our life. It is only through conversion, through proclaiming, ‘Here I am!’
to the neighbour, that one experiences ‘the glory of a long desire’. In this
experience, the Infinite – the Logos – speaks ‘through my mouth’80 in order to
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break ‘the bad silence which harbours Gyges’s secrecy’. The secret of
Gyges,82 in one sense, is like the silent rumbling of the ‘there is’ that seeks to
totalise its victims into anonymous existence. Through reflection, the secret of
evil is revealed, and above all through the ethical life one perceives the invisible
suffering of the poor one. Answering for our neighbour’s poverty through the
sacrifice of one’s time, energies, wealth and spirit is to open up the horizon of
infinite goodness in a universe of expanding hope. Gyges’ secret action of
seducing the queen and usurping the kingdom speaks of the dark side of the
human ego. Left to our own pleasure-seeking needs, one becomes a tyrant. This
is what Levinas means by ‘being’. However, to be ‘otherwise than being’ is to be
‘in the name of God’83 a hostage of the poor one. Such a kenotic life of being for
the other is the secret of the universe witnessing to the glory of the Infinite God.
The life of kenosis is the glorious transformation of being a new creation. From
the standpoint of Christian faith, it is the Lord Jesus Christ who ‘will transform
the body of our humiliation that it may be conformed to the body of his glory, by
the power that also enables him to make all things subject to himself’ (Phil 3:21).

4. Levinas and the Eucharist
In Levinas’ writings on ‘Judaism and Christianity,’84 he tries to
deconstruct the meaning of the Christian Eucharist. For him, the true Eucharistic
sacrifice is the expiating responsibility one takes for the poor one. Levinas
81
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asserts: ‘Having learned later the theological concepts of transubstantiation and
the eucharist, I would tell myself that the true communion was in the meeting
with the other, rather than the bread and the wine, and that it was in the encounter
that the personal presence of God resided.’85
Theologically, the Eucharist gives the believer spiritual strength to be in a ‘true
communion’ with the other. The proclamation of the Gospel is demanding.
Levinas’s dialectical polemic against Christianity helps to reinforce to the
Christian the reality of living the life of ‘eucharistic sacrifice’ demands the
imitation of Christ. There is much the Christian and Christian theology can learn
from Levinas’ understanding of ‘Eucharist’.

Levinas emphasises Eucharistic living as analogous to the spiritual
understanding of ‘God’s kenosis’ and ‘the humility of God’s presence on earth’.86
Isn’t the celebration of the Christian Eucharist a sign of God’s true presence with
us on earth? At the heart of the Eucharist are the paschal mystery and the call to
live one’s life in a paschal way. Levinas’ metaphysics underlines this meaning by
emphasising the religious ethic of being responsible for the other’s death:

I think in responsibility for the Other, one is, in the final analysis,
responsible for the death of the other. Is not the rectitude of the other’s
look an exposure par excellence, an exposure unto death? … This is
probably the foundation of sociality and of love without eros. The fear for
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the death of the other is certainly at the basis of the responsibility for
him.87

In the celebration of the Eucharist, Christ’s sacrifice for us is understood as the
divine action of God’s love for us (Jn 3:16). In Christ, the triune God feared for
our death; moreover our eternal death. Christ’s fear for our death was
encountered par excellence on the Cross – in his death. Christ’s death meant the
Eucharistic communion of God eternally being with us, despite our lack of
responsibility and sinfulness.

In dying, Christ through the Resurrection bears the fruit of God’s salvific
presence with us. No longer is death to be feared. No longer are we alone for
Christ is with us in the form of having a ‘Eucharistic’ love for the neighbour. In
dying, Christ’s face upon the Cross proclaimed, ‘Thou shalt not kill!’ The
Eucharist commemorates the sacredness of life and the reality that disinterested
love for the other conquers death. Where the poor one is fearful of death or
frightened by a rumbling silence, this neighbour whom we have never known or
never wanted to know, is the locus of God’s ‘rumbling,’ calling us to partake of
Eucharistic communion with the poor one.

Levinas’ metaphysics emphasises a love free of eroticism: the love of
one’s neighbour. This is sociality or, in Christian theology, it can be coined as
Eucharistic living. What makes Levinas negatively interpret erotic love? It is
because such love is exclusive and fed by one’s personal needs and hunger for
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pleasure. It is not disinterested love. Erotic love is the life of ‘being’ (being for
oneself). Levinas’ prophetic ethical metaphysics – immersed in the wisdom of
the Talmud and directed by the memory of the Shoah – mirrors the experience of
Christ. Is not the death of Christ a kenosis? Is not the Shoah a ‘passion’ and a
kenosis wherein the faith of every Jew in God was infinitely tested?

The Eucharist is itself a sign of the commandment, ‘Thou shalt not kill!’
Levinas reflects: ‘To give oneself totally to the other to respond to his unspoken
request, to the expression of his face, to his mortality, his ‘Thou shalt not kill.’’88
Developing a theology of the Eucharist with Levinas’ metaphysics helps to give
clarity to Christ’s mission and the Trinity’s love for us through the Eucharist.
Christ’s mission is kenotic to the point of self-emptying himself on the Cross.
This symbolises that we are not alone in death and suffering. God is with us in
the ruins of our human spirit. Triune love is experienced not only through
partaking of the Eucharist, but also in the Eucharistic communion of hearing the
Word of God in the neighbour’s face. The Holy Spirit awakes our spirit and
conscience to the command of the other’s face. The inner secret revealed to our
spirit and conscience is that ‘God writes straight with crooked lines’.89 Even
though we follow a ‘crooked road’90 and we are at times broken to the point of
despair, we are nonetheless responsible for each other and for the whole universe.
The host is broken during the Eucharist, and so symbolically our broken lives are
offered to God as an expiating sacrifice. Our sacrifice is to be ‘otherwise than
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being’: ethically responsible for the other’s death. All our mind, heart, soul and
strength share in the Eucharistic love of the triune God.

Conclusion: L’chaim – to Life!
A common thread in intuiting various Christian theological themes from
the works of Levinas is kenosis. It underlies expiation, substitution, infinite
responsibility, and disinterested love. Kenosis is the grace of holiness that seeks
to reconstruct the ruins of the spirit broken by economic oppression and political
violence. To perceive God in the neighbour is to attend to the neighbour’s
suffering. It is to hear his or her cries, moans and sighs. To enter the neighbour’s
world is to behold a naked face. The face is full of destitution because it is
suffering. The trace of goodness has never been present.

I have pointed out that any thinking about the origins of the universe must
begin with ethics. For the Christian, this gives an insight to the question, ‘Who is
Christ?’ How can we learn about Christ if we do not seek to participate in the
triune drama of goodness? Christ himself took on the world’s insoluble problems
infested by power, envy and pride. If we too, like Christ, answer before the
suffering neighbour with our lives, then perhaps the Divine Word may in fact be
articulated. The problem with any knowledge by itself is its possibilities to
control and destroy. However, knowledge with a foundation of ethics produces
hope especially to overcome the insoluble problems of human suffering and evil.
Does not the glory of the Cross and Resurrection testify to the victory over human
death and sin?
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Levinas’ metaphysics is a valuable tool for Christian theology. It
emphasises that Christian theology is imbued by philosophy. Just as Aristotle
proved of enduring value for Aquinas, Levinas and the whole tradition of
Husserlian phenomenology is a valuable partner for Christian theology. What
makes Levinas’ works also appealing is the presence of the Talmud in his
writings. The Talmud in many ways has been a tradition that has barely been
present to Christian theology. Through the transposition of Christian theology to
Levinas’ metaphysics, the Talmud is made available – at least for Christian
academics.

In responding to the following lines of a talmudic text91, ‘A Sadducee saw
Raba buried in study holding his fingers beneath his foot and rubbing it so hard
that blood spurted from it,’ Levinas writes:

As if by chance, to rub in such a way that blood spurts out is perhaps the
way one must ‘rub’ the text to arrive at the life it conceals. Many of you
are undoubtedly thinking, with good reason, that at this very moment, I am
in the process of rubbing the text to make it spurt blood – I rise to the
challenge.92

In this article, I have indeed tried to ‘rub’ at Levinas’s writings ‘to make it spurt
blood’. It is a bold challenge particularly because Levinas is Jewish and to
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transpose Christian theology to Levinas’ philosophy runs the risk of Christian
imperialism. Despite this danger, Levinas’ writings offer a meeting place for
Christian and Jewish academics. The meeting place is one of ethics. Ethics is a
common ground for Christians and Jews especially because of the primary ethic
of the love of one’s neighbour. Although, I have tended not to be critical of
Levinas’ writings, except in isolated instances concerning the difficulty of
interpreting them, there are several limitations. What seems to stand out is the
lack of understanding the importance of joy. Should not the life of responsibility
for the neighbour be one of joy? Having encountered and reflected upon the
world’s tragedies, Levinas’ writings become very grave and exhortative. For
Christians, the paschal life is not only a burden to be made light by Christ, but
also the possibility for joy (cf. Luke 15:10). The absence of joy in Levinas’
thought points to an important contribution for Christian theology to offer to
ethical metaphysics.

Theology must never be dormant. Ultimately, one only has a partial
understanding of God. Developing the theological themes in the context of
Levinas’ writings such as God, the love of one’s neighbour, the paschal mystery,
evil, sin, cosmology and the Eucharist is to attempt ‘to arrive at the life’ Levinas
‘conceals’ for Christianity. This life is the prophetic teaching of infinite
responsibility and that each of us is ‘the soul of the universe’. Possessing the
dignity of ‘the soul of the universe’ is to share in God’s kenosis and suffering.
Our suffering is not useless. Levinas gives us a good reason to live. Being
responsible for the other before our personal freedom is life. This is the witness
of glory proclaiming, ‘L’chaim!’

